Singer - the Level-Of-Analysis Problem in International Relations

Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”

• Systematic level gives comprehensive and total picture of IR
• National/sub-systemic gives greater detail, depth; permits more thorough investigation of the processes by which foreign policies are made

Walt, “One World, Many Theories”

• Realism: depicts IR as a struggle for power among self-interested states
• Morgenthau: believed that states, like humans, have innate desire to dominate others, which led them to fight wars.  He also stressed the virtues of the classical, multipolar balance-of-power system; thought that bipolar rivalry between US and Soviet Union was dangerous.  
• Waltz focused on the effects of the system.  For Waltz, the international system consisted of a number of great powers, each seeking to survive.  Because the system is anarchic, each state has to survive on its own – a condition that would lead weaker states to balance against, rather than bandwagon with, more powerful rivals.  Contrary to Morgenthau, claimed that bipolarity was more stable than multi-polarity.
• Jervis, Quester, Van Evera, Defensive Realists: argued that war was more likely when states could conquer each other easily.  When defense was easier than offense, security was more plentiful, incentives to expand declined, and cooperation could blossom.  States merely sought to survive and great powers could guarantee security by forming balancing alliances and choosing defensive military postures  
• Defensive realists assume states have little intrinsic interest in military conquest and argue that the costs of expansion generally outweigh the benefits
• Great power wars occur largely, then, because domestic groups foster exaggerated perceptions of threat; by militarism, hypernationalism, or some other distorting domestic factor
• Offensive realists argue that anarchy encourages all states to try to maximize their relative strength because no state can ever be sure when a truly revisionist state (e.g. Hitler’s Germany) might emerge.  Believe that anarchy forces great powers to compete irrespective of their internal characteristics.  
• Signs that theories are converging: Realists recognize that nationalism, militarism, ethnicity, domestic factors are important; liberals acknowledge that power is central to international behavior; some constructivists admit that ideas will have greater impact when backed by powerful states
• Realism is most compelling: states continually worry about the balance of power and the possibility of major conflict; but liberal theories identify the instruments that states can use to achieve shared interests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and societies must now contend, and help us understand why states may differ in their basic preferences; constructivist theories help us understanding the subtle shifts in identities and interests→ change behavior of states→shifts in IR  
• Each are important: realism’s emphasis on inescapable role of power, liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces, constructivism’s vision of change

Byman and Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In”

• Challenge scholars to reconsider the role of individuals in international relations
• Asserting that the time has come “to rescue men and women, as individual, from the oblivion to which political scientists have consigned them,” they debunk standard explanations for why individuals do not “matter” in international affairs

Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” (http://wikisum.com/w/Jervis:_Cooperation_under_the_security_dilemma)

• Problem: Anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible.  There must be some mechanism which allows states to bind themselves not to “defect” or at least some mechanism by which to detect defection early enough to respond appropriately
• Two main variables: the offense/defense balance (whether it’s easier to fight or defend) and the ability to distinguish between offensive/defensive postures (intentions).
• Cannot Differentiate/Offensive advantage in balance → dangerous world because countries have an incentive to take offensive action to increase their security; they have an inherent mistrust of each other because they cannot determine their neighbors intentions from their actions.
• Cannot Differentiate/Defensive advantage → Security dilemma will exist, but defensive advantage will give countries an incentive to invest primarily defensive capabilities.
• Can Differentiate/Offensive advantage → Security dilemma will not operate, but countries will have an incentive to use offensive action to protect themselves.  Status-quo states can differentiate themselves from aggressors and there will ikely be warning of an aggressors’ intentions.
• Can Differentiate/Defensive → Safest possible environment.