Columbia's Final Mission

Introduction –

The Space Shuttle Columbia left wing was struck by a large piece of foam from the external fuel tank during its launch on January 16, 2003. Even though this strike didn’t immediately disable the Columbia’s space mission, it eventually lead to the destruction of the space shuttle and the deaths of Columbia’s seven member crew. Could this tragedy have been prevented? How much damage could a piece of foam do to the vehicle? These were all questions that NASA had right after the space shuttle broke apart over North America on its return home flight to Florida.

The concept of the shuttle as a reusable vehicle was created in 1970s as a result of NASA's budget cutback. The implemented technologies were experimental, revolutionary and innovative, but there was pressure to make it look routine to buy-in customers. NASA's promises of the reliability, efficiency, and safety of the shuttle had provided substantial funding for the program, but funding still was not enough for the complex design specification. So, some important safety features like an escape system for the crew were not part of the design. Driven by the schedule demand, the final steps of the Columbia's development, including tiles mounting, were not done in the manufacturing facility in California but at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida by engineers. The testing regiments were deviated and analytic models were used to verify the entire system. That was not a normal procedure. Only after the disaster proper tests did identify the technical problem of the Columbia's final flight.

Problems Identified

1. Foam Strikes –Over the years, NASA knew that foam was coming loose from the external fuel tank and sticking the Shuttles. Sixty five of the seventy nine missions, NASA of which imagery was available recorded a foam loss. In 1990, agency managers classified foam loss as an “in-flight anomaly”. Meanwhile, the External Tank Project at MSFC concluded that debris strikes did no constitute a safety of flight issue. The External Tank Project downplayed the dangers and determined that they should categorize it as an “action” which lead to no action as to what was causing the tanks to lose the foam that created the foam strikes on the Shuttle.

2. Ordering Photo Imagery – After seeing the foam strike on Columbia the Intercenter Photo Working Group found that the camera angel was blurry and did not clarify the size, shape, or momentum of the foam or the location of the impact. Due to budget cutbacks, NASA had reduced the cameral staff and kept poorly maintained camera lenses. The five camera’s that tracked the launch failed to capture an image at all. The Intercenter Photo Working Group determined that they needed better imagery to access potential damage accurately. The group hoped that NASA