Afghanistan Case

Pakistan, having supported the Afghan Mujahideen since 1979, switched its support to the Taliban from 1996 and later recognized the Taliban Govt. Analyze a) the reason for this change, b) its implications on Pakistan’s relations with regional countries and c) on Pakistan-US Relations.

Afghanistan has been a battle ground of changing alliances, betrayal, and involvement of foreign elements at the expense of the political, economic and social catastrophe of the region. Notions such as ‘Yesterdays enemies are today’s friends; today’s friends are tomorrows enemies’ have often been experienced in the due course. Issues such as changing royalties from the Mujahideen to the Taliban, determining the feasibility of the latter in the short and long run, and looking at alternatives to this strategy, require an understanding of the historical contexts, and prevalent circumstances. Was supporting Taliban the most favorable option? Could there not be a better alternative for Pakistan to achieve the same interests it intended to achieve with the Taliban political monopoly in the neighborhood?

The demography of Afghanistan experienced myriad changes following the decision of the Polit Bureau to invade Afghanistan in 1979. It brought all the major stakeholders having interests in the geostrategic importance of Afghanistan to the forefront with the aim of resisting the movement. The major players among them being Saudia Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, India, and most importantly, the United States; each playing its own moves to maintain some influence in the region. However, the interests of the involved players in Afghanistan did not fade with the withdrawal of Soviets from the scene, and each entity aimed to inject its own control over the region, thus leading to a topsy-turvy politically fragmented Afghanistan.

The emergence of the Mujahideen (7 tanzeemat factions) backed by an inundation of military, and financial assistance from regional stakeholders such as Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, proved out to be a major barricade to the evil intention of the big bear forcing it to back off ultimately. However, the crisis appeared on the scene once the Soviets withdrew, and the United States having met its interests left Afghanistan in a state of political turmoil and civil war. The Mujahideen who had once formed an alliance against the invaders were now fighting each other on the question of attaining political influence in Kabul. Of the Mujahideen groups, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, leader of the Hizb-i-Islami group was most favored by the ISI, owing to its major contribution towards the Afghan campaign in the sight of the agency, while groups led by Masud and his northern alliance of Dostam, Mazari and Naderi were not under the direct control of Pakistan.

Alliances, however, kept on changing and taking u-turns and all Afghanistan faced was a rivalry amongst factions, not intending the establishment