Churchill's Wisdom of the Mediterranean Strategy

Joseph Nunes – History Assessment

“Use your knowledge of strategy in the second world war to access how useful Source N is as evidence of the wisdom of Churchill’s Mediterranean Strategy.” (10 Marks)

Source N suggests that Churchill recognised the importance of the empire during the war. Source N shows this, “Our first imperial obligation”. This suggests that protecting the empire and the Suez canal would have been strategically useful because it would have prevented the Germans from gaining useful resources in the Middle east and to prevent them from gaining full control of the passage to the southern hemisphere, hence suggesting that this was strategically wise. On the other hand, one could argue that this is incorrect as Britain’s main priority should have been to invade France and Germany in order to end the war as soon as possible, therefore the idea to send troops to North Africa and the Middle East as part of the Mediterranean strategy was not wise which makes this source less useful

Source N suggests Churchill believed that the eastern front was well protected and that Germany didn’t need Britain’s attention. “I had faith in the Russian armies and nation fighting in defence of their native soil.” This would suggest that the Mediterranean strategy was wise as Churchill’s allies had the eastern front under control. However, one could argue that this is incorrect as the main reason for the avoidance of an invasion of France and Germany was due to a fear of heavy casualties and many people were scared of conflict in France due to memories of WW1. This can be said because even after the victory of El Alemein which gained the control over the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, Britain still decided to remain there. Due to this, it can be said that this source is less useful as evidence of Churchill’s wisdom.

Source N was written in 1951 by Winston Churchill himself. Since it was written after the Allied victory, it is easy for Churchill to say that his strategies contributed to the fall of Nazi Germany.  However, while making the decisions to avoid the invasion of France and Germany during the war, it was impossible for Churchill to have known the outcome. The ultimate uncertainty of his actions and his decisions regarding the Mediterranean strategy allows the source to be deemed as less useful as evidence of his wisdom. Furthermore, since the source was written by Churchill himself, it is quite unlikely that he would criticise the Mediterranean Strategy as it was his decision to execute it. Therefore, even though the source presents this strategy as being wise, it is incorrect to use it as useful evidence since Churchill would not write a counter-argument to his decision within this source. Due to this, his wisdom cannot be fairly presented.