Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster Case Study

Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster

Executive Summary

NASA revolutionized the space program with the invention of the reusable space shuttle. Because of economic pressure, NASA’s budget was cut significantly. In order to save money, a hybrid liquid and solid fuel system was developed instead of the proposed all liquid system. The design relied on segments, which had never been using before on manned spacecraft. Two O-rings were used to seal the joint at each segment of the solid rocket booster, with the second functioning as a backup. It was critical that all the hot gases stay within the capsule because if they escaped, the O-rings would be damaged. If the O-rings failed, then so would the shuttle. O-ring erosion became more of a problem with each successive mission. Mission 51-L was scheduled to take off on January 25, but was delayed a few times due to cold weather. Finally on the 28th, NASA decided to launch the shuttle, even though it had reached 26F overnight. The lowest temperature a shuttle had previously been launched was 53F. Thiokol, the designer of the SRB couldn’t find a reason not to launch the shuttle, and gave their blessing. The shuttle lifted off the pad in 48F weather at 11:38am, and 74 seconds into the flight the Challenger exploded, killing everyone on board.

There were many problems encountered by the shuttle program. Even though the two O-rings were at first classified as critical, later on they were considered redundant. Spare parts were hard to come by, so parts were used of other shuttles. Excessive paperwork was bogging down the staff, so they issued waivers on processes that had been proven in the past to save time. Even components critical to safety and operation were given waivers, meaning they would not be scrutinized as thoroughly as normal.

The new project lifecycle started as soon as the previous shuttle came back on earth, and ended when it launched into the sky. The project stakeholders consisted of the NASA team, subcontractors, the end users (astronauts), and even every American looking into space. One major place NASA failed was managing stakeholder expectations. They let the media and the White House pressure them into launching before it was safe. Ironically, the media chastised NASA for not being safe after the disaster.

The most important recommendation is to put safety above all else. It’s not just lost money and time if something happens to the payload anymore. NASA should not allow critical parts to have waivers put on them. True quantitative analysis should be performed to help improve safety. This will give a much better picture than the qualitative analysis NASA has been using, which is sometimes open for interpretation. Another recommendation is to relax the scheduled number of flights to a point where the missions can be prepared for properly without cutting