The Bamako Agreement

The Bamako agreement, the fruit of an authoritarian diplomacy

The agreement has been signed under strong international pressure. Algeria, France and the United Nations Mission in Mali played a major role in convincing the alliance of Tuareg and Arab-led rebels to join the peace talks. The CMA, who wished to avoid being compared to the Al-Qaida fighters who overpowered the Tuareg rebels in the north of Mali in 2012 and appeared as real enemies to peace, eventually agreed to sign the treaty. However, not only was this decision not fully motivated by the will to establish sustainable peace in the region, but some CMA members voiced their disagreement regarding the peace framework.

This event, that happened only one day after the sign up, led to a dangerous wave of distrust between the signatories. Some CMA members even called for an extraordinary meeting of militant and combatants pro Azawad (the territory in northern Mali that rebels briefly declared independent in 2012).

Significantly, no leader from the central region attended the peace talks in Algiers. Their absence at the signing ceremonies casts another shadow on the prospect of lasting peace.

Under such tension, peace talks do more harm than good. After negotiations we slowed down in March, tensions between armed groups in the north of the country escalated. The month of May was the most violent since 2013. About 30 000 people fled their homes around Timbuktu as the area was no longer safe due to fighting. The attacks on civilians we also renewed and included summary executions near Gao.

The use of authoritarian diplomacy has therefor come with a price. Forcing parties to join the peace treaties resulted in disagreements within the coalitions and waves of uproar in unstable regions of the country. But this is not the only cause of concern as the content of the treaty itself can hinder long term peace.