The Concorde

In 1956, the British government began research into the development of a supersonic aircraft

for service in commercial transport. Over the next twenty years, the development of such an aircraft,

the Concorde, was undertaken by a consortium consisting of the British and French governments and

four independent companies that would undertake development of specific aircraft components. In

development, the Concorde was intended, and expected by many, to herald in a new age of supersonic

travel that would make long‐distance, subsonic travel obsolete. Despite one hundred initial orders from

sixteen airlines, only fourteen aircraft entered service for two airlines and no other supersonic aircraft

have entered service since.

While the Concorde achieved many of its technical objectives, delivered a unique (and fast)

customer experience and served profitably for more than a quarter‐century, the Concorde failed as

breakthrough innovation that would change the face of transportation. While the sonic boom of

supersonic travel limited the Concorde to overseas travel, the primary reasons for the Concorde’s failure

as a breakthrough technology are the misalignment of goals between the organization developing the

innovation and the companies that would operate the aircraft, as well as the failure to realize that the

personal travel market had matured to the point where value and price, not performance, were the

dominant factors influencing consumer choice.

After initial efforts in both countries to develop supersonic commercial aircraft, the Concorde

was conceived and financed through a partnership of the British and French governments in an effort to

reduce overall development costs and at the expense design specifications preferred by each nation.

The design and construction was executed by four companies from Britain and France. Throughout the

development and design process, the airlines that would operate