Can Reason Aid in Avoiding Morally Evil and Achieving Moral Good?

Do you think the exercise of reason, without the assistance of other human capacities, can motivate a human being to do what is morally good and avoid what is morally evil? Why or why not? (Please refer to Hume in your answer)

Hume quotes within his highly esteemed and equally debated work the ‘Treatise' that - ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of passions'1. This is the viewpoint that will be used as the foundation for the proceeding essay. I will argue throughout that reason is exactly that, the slave of passions. However it is vital to note from the outset that this in no way belittles the importance of reason in any decision making process; including that of moral predicaments. I will also address arguments from his critics; yet aim to conclude that reason is indeed the slave of passions, and thus is unable to motivate actions let alone moral difficulties.

Reason, the mere calculations of possible actions and outcomes, as I will aim to prove, are an able to motivate one, but rather educate and inform the mind. Without the presence of passion, the lesions leant from reason are just thoughts containing no inspiration for action, effectively empty vessels of information. It is as Hume alludes indeed the passions that truly motivate action.

Imagine a computer – it has the ability of complex reasoning, it can work out difficult mathematics and correct grammar among many other capabilities. These can all be considered as forms of reasoning. However, without passion, the results of reasoning go unacted upon, but rather sit on the screen offering information to the user, whom in this example is effectively the passions. Able if enthused so to act on the information provided. The passionless computer feels no pity, remorse, has no pride in its work and is unable to make a moral judgment. It is the approximant equivalent of a passionless human being, one that is capable of reasoning, yet uninspired to act upon it.

To further my argument I will continue with Hume's personification by referring to reason as a ‘slave'. To achieve this I will employ a metaphor coined by philosopher A. T. Nuyen. Just like it is in the slave owner's best interest to never ill-treat his slaves, is it equally important for us to treat reason with due respect. Both reason and slaves are integral to their respective masters creations, it would be impossible for them to complete tasks effectively without a majority of the work being completed by the slaves. However, no matter how talented the slaves without the master to direct them, they go unutilized, sitting stagnate until the master decides action is required.2

As Hume quotes "reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection' (T 458). And he uses this to show, both directly and indirectly, that moral distinctions are not derived from reason."3 In line with Humes reasoning provided