Do You Agree with the ontological Argument for God’s Existence? Why or Why Not?

Do you agree with the ontological argument for god’s existence? Why or why not?

Introduction 

In life, most humans are born into families who follow a certain religion, and that religion is taught and believed from a very young age with almost no empirical proof. However, based on the nature of modern society, where information on the world, science, and existence is vastly accessible and readily available, several arguments for and against religion as a whole have risen. Saint Anselm of Canterbury (Anselm) is known to have introduced the concept of the ontological argument for God’s existence in the 11th century. Anselm’s notoriously complicated ontological argument for God’s existence stems from a priori, non-empirical perspective, and is solely based on logic. While some scholars agree with the foundation of Anselm’s argument, many have criticised his logical reasoning and have presented their version of the ontological argument. This essay explores both Anselm’s classical and second version of his ontological argument, while exploring other philosophical scholar’s perspective on various versions of the ontological argument, where some use modal logic in an attempt to add validity to their argument. Overall, it seems somewhat difficult to accept the various versions of the ontological argument for Gods existence. While scholars use logic and reasoning in an attempt to prove the argument, it seems there is always a valuable, intelligible criticism which makes the arguments less convincing and less valid. Nevertheless, the ontological argument will be discussed in great detail, shedding light on the concept based on metaphysical theories, arguments, and criticism by various scholars.

The Classical Version of the Ontological Argument

Ontological arguments derive from a priori, logical and necessary premises which conclude that God exists based on reasoning and observation from these premises (Oppy, 2015). To simply summarise Oppy’s English version of Anselm’s argument: ‘Non-existence would imply imperfection. Since God is imagined in the mind as a perfect being with all possible ‘great-making properties’, and ‘existence in reality’ is categorised within these ‘great-making properties’, it would be self-contradictory and internally inconsistent to claim this God does not actually exist in reality’. It seems this version of Anselm’s argument is logical and accurate only if the reader takes the argument at face-value, as Anselm makes several assumptions which makes his argument questionable. “God” is discussed and projected as a divine being who has certain ‘great making properties’, such as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. Redefined in simple English, these properties are infinite knowledge, infinite power, authority and control, and infinite kindness and goodwill. Based on the complicated and sophisticated nature of life, our world, and the universe, it seems only natural for any theist human to perceive a divine creator, such as God, as a Being who encompasses these great making properties. However, it seems very unlikely that these people would include the property of “existence” as a ‘great-making property’ when describing their perception of God, as theists would assume that God exists as a foundation of their perception of God, as most religions forbid questioning God’s existence. Henceforth, Anselm’s argument is heavily criticised as it is centred around the idea that “existence” is a crucial, additional element of these ‘great making properties’ of God (Alston, 1960). Gaunilo of Marmoutier, a monk who lived at the time when Anselm proposed the ontological argument, criticised Anselm’s argument by using a corresponding counterexample and replaced the word “God” in Anselm’s formal argument with “a perfect island”, inferring that the logic from Anselm’s argument could apply to any non-existent entity (Himma, 2015). Furthermore, Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher of the 18th century, claimed that existence is a ‘metaphysically necessary condition’ for an entity to contain any properties whatsoever, and therefore, ‘existence’ does not make an entity better for having the property (Himma, 2015). Therefore, it seems clear that Anselm’s first version of his ontological argument is illogical, unconvincing, and false.