Spinoza Case

At first glance Spinoza's definition of God as infinite seemingly correlates with the widely accepted versions of God. It is his further clarification of such an infinite being as possessing all possible attributes which changes his definition from others. If a thing is to have all attributes, then it would have attributes which imply the lack of another. For example, if God encompasses all attributes, then God has the attributes of both darkness and light. However, a thing cannot be both dark and light, as they are opposites. The presence of one in a being implicitly defines that it cannot also contain the other. If something is dark it implies the absence of light and therefore leads to the impossibility of anything containing such polar opposites.

This definition of the infinite would lead to the implication that, even if an infinite being did exist, it would need to somehow possess contradictory attributes, which is impossible in the definition of a being. This could be fixed by God being a substance. However, this would imply, through the definition of a substance, that God would encompass everything. God would be the substance. This being a radical idea in that it would mean that every single thing would be in God, or rather that God would have to be the entire universe.

Spinoza's definition of God, or the existence of an infinite being, is essential in the proof of Proposition 11. Spinoza explains the necessity of an infinite being with his explanation of the power the inexistence of infinite beings would give to finite beings. He states how the non-existence of the infinite would deny the infinite of power, still leaving the finite to exist. This in turn would lead to the finite being more powerful than the infinite, solely due to the fact that the finite do exist.

The finite being more powerful than the infinite is a clear contradiction of both their meanings. This leaves us with the conclusion that an infinite being must exist, and through his definition of God we are