From the Perspective of the Problem Space Theory and the Information Processing Approach Are the Findings in This Paper Compatible or Not with the Idea That Insight Is Nothing Special? Why?

From the perspective of the Problem Space Theory and the information processing approach are the findings in this paper compatible or not with the idea that insight is nothing special? Why?

Kunios et al.’s (2006) findings are incompatible with the Problem space theory’s (Newell & Simon, 1971) notion that insight is nothing special. The problem space theory delineates that humans are information processing systems whereby problem-solving is a sequential accumulation of partial information which progress the solver from their present problem state to desired goal states (Metcalfe & Wiebe,1987). Individuals build a homomorphic mental representation of a problem in reality from internal and external memory, assumptions, textual inferences and experience. Then consciously navigates through the problem space using cognitive operators to reduce the scope of the problem to a manageable set of possibilities. However, some literature indicates that there is also a qualitatively different form of problem-solving to incremental search processes, whereby the solution to a problem suddenly comes to mind once certain critical steps have been reached. Wertheimer (1959) defined insight as a form of productive thinking whereby the global reconfiguration of a problem space reveals solutions to the problem, which were not obvious previously. Empirical research denotes that insight is meta-cognitively different to incremental problems (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987), significantly more susceptible to interference (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993) and can occur without conscious awareness (Siegler & Stern, 1998).

Kunios et al.’s (2006) findings identify qualitatively distinct preparatory mechanisms and brain states, which specifically facilitate insight problem-solving. In two experiments (Kunios, 2006), neural activity was examined prior and during both a 3 word easy semantic task (experiment 1) and a series of compound remote associate problems (experiment 2). fMRI and EEG recordings identified heightened activity in medial frontal and temporal areas associated with cognitive control and semantic processing, respectively during insight problem-solving preparation (Kunios, 2006). A significant increase of fMRI activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) prior to insight suggests activation of preparatory