Rob Hall and Scott Fischer - Five Climbers During the May 1996 Mount Everest Expedition

The death of five climbers during the May 1996 Mount Everest expedition lead by Rob Hall and Scott Fischer can’t be attributed to a single cause, but was instead the result of multiple interrelated decisions and events. Attempting to reach the summit of Everest falls into the classification of both a complex and tightly coupled system, which would be subject to the Normal Accident Theory. This theory states that, due to imperfect human design, unexpected failures are bound to happen, whether with the equipment, procedures, or even the environment, and the unforeseeable combination of these failures can lead to catastrophic results (Talen 33). The factors that contributed to the fatalities within this specific complex system can be categorized into three areas: avoidable errors, unavoidable issues, and mistakes made during execution.

The avoidable errors encompass the decisions that were made while planning the expedition. These are considered avoidable due to the completely coherent and objective state that the experienced principals (Hall and Fischer) were operating in during the initial stage of the expedition. The first aspect of preparation involved the selection of the employees who formed their respective teams, Adventure Consultants and Mountain Madness. The individuals that were chosen seemed to all exhibit the personal orientations of competitors; as climbing to the top of the highest peak in the world tends to attract accomplishment driven individuals who yearn for the recognition that accompanies achieving such a monumental feat. This can result in mixed motives between the team members, as they needed to support each other to reach their goal, but were ultimately concerned with their own safety and accomplishments (Greenburg, 2013). The leaders also created a culture within their teams that discouraged the flow of upward communication or open feedback from the guides and Sherpas by declaring their orders resolute. This was evident from the testimonies of guides Boukreev and Beidleman, where they both admitted to withholding major concerns due to their perceived status within the team. Greenburg specifically cites management’s unwillingness to give control to other members of their team as a barrier to overall team performance.

Beyond the intricacies of creating a successful team, there were also logistical errors that aided in the failure of the expedition. Both principals (Fischer following Hall’s regimen) supplied only a few outdated radios to their team and left the clients to rely solely their contact with the guides. Even Adams, who had limited climbing experience, noted the illogicality of choosing this system of communication when much more advanced technology options were readily available. Small personal radios would have added virtually no burden to the clients, and would have resulted in a highly valued link to expertise if they were to become separated from the guides. Lastly, Boukreev’s decision to climb without supplemental oxygen should have been superseded by Fischer. As a commercial enterprise, every precaution to ensure the success in servicing the client should be taken. No matter what motives Boukreev had for refusing to bring oxygen with him, the value of having the extra life-supporting oxygen tanks would have been monumental to his and the client’s safety in case of an emergency. Planning of the expedition is the most important stage to consider the resulting errors, as this is the best opportunity to make adjustments, without the hindrance of the physical stress that occurs on the mountain face.