Is Singapore's Defence Policy Necessary?

Despite being one of the most efficient armed forces in South-East Asia, one may only measure the full extent of the importance accorded to defence by the Singaporean policy makers by taking a look at the numbers: Singapore’s population (5,607,300)1 is eighteen times smaller than that of the Philippines (100 003 370)2, yet the former spends three and a half (US$ 10,42 bn)3 times more on defence than the latter (US$ 3 bn)4. Since its independence in 1965, Singapore has never ceased to pursue and attain self-reliance and autonomous deterrence, by allocating a fair part of its GDP (3,35% in 2017) to its armed forces. To fully understand this drive towards military autonomy, it is necessary to go back in history and examine where Singapore’s sense of vulnerability and need for self-reliance come from, as well as the regional security context in South-East Asia. Furthermore, we shall study the economic and diplomatic impacts of such an extensive defence policy, and whether the government should resort or not to “more reasonable and intelligent spending of national funds”5 (Dr Tambyah, Singapore Democratic Party).

Regional security environment

In 1967, the ASEAN declaration was signed by Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand at a time where relations between the states in the region were increasingly tense due to small conflicts and disputes between one another (ex: the Indonesian Konfrontansi or the territorial issues between Malaysia and Philippines). ASEAN was therefore viewed as a solution to prevent future regional conflicts with the renunciation of the use of force as a founding clause. However, mutual distrust meant that a military alliance could not be formed, thus maintaining ASEAN a “socio-economic organisation”6. Furthermore, the effects of war in the Indochinese area were a major argument for the ASEAN states not to clearly align themselves with one foreign power or another, but rather develop a self-centred relationship. This idea was reinforced by the instability with which supposedly powerful allies such as Britain or the USA acted: British withdrawal from Asia and Nixon doctrine. Today: the organisation's membership has expanded to include Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. However, while the organisation has significantly matured and started implementing defence cooperation mechanisms (establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 or the inauguration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting in 2006), joint-military agreements are still noticeably bilateral rather than multilateral, due mostly to an absence of consensus exacerbated by a membership expansion. As a result, no formal security alliance has been achieved, thus leaving each country to fend for its own. This security context is important to take into account when considering the Singapore case.

Singapore’s strategic point