An Analysis of the Development of Nietzsche’s Moral Critique

In the discussion of morality within contemporary society, one’s perception ultimately arrives upon an implicit set of presupposed values and imperatives. These values appear as so inherent that to question their nature would approach questioning the very foundation of one’s own existence as an individual in society, shaking the understanding of his very consciousness. Friedrich Nietzsche, in his work On the Genealogy of Morality, makes just such an assessment of our current state of morality, tracking its evolution and development in an attempt to reach beyond our “moral prejudices” and attain a greater understanding of man’s proper being and purpose. Nietzsche’s approach to the investigation of morality, through the construction of a general “genealogy” of the subject, is crucial for the development of his theory, as it produces an understanding which can only be found through a complete dismissal of established ideals and institutions. Furthermore, it is in this conclusion on morality where the moral philosophy of another significant thinker, Immanuel Kant, is found to be reflected. Yet, although these two thinkers effectively reach similar conclusions on both the nature of man in current moral society and the manner in which he might obtain freedom, Kant’s use of reason directly conflicts with the very underlying principles of Nietzsche’s concept of truth, forcing the two to remain evidently dissimilar in thought.

To begin, let us first address Nietzsche’s method of approach, or the use of morality’s genealogy, to then determine the manner in which it allows him conclusion by abstraction. Nietzsche begins his discussion by noting two distinct forms of morality, deeming them “noble morality” and “slave morality.” The former of the two, preceding the latter in formation, is found by Nietzsche to have an origin within the desire of noble, powerful persons to maintain their dominance over a lesser class. Nietzsche states in his description that, while some may claim the origin of morality being founded in some “unegoistic acts,” this is an “essentially unhistorical” evaluation without truth (Nietzsche, 11). In reality, the relation between the noble and the inferior peasant are what stands as “the origin of the antithesis of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’” with the designation of the noble placing himself and his power as that which is “good” and the poor, lowly peasant as that which is “bad” (Nietzsche, 12). As such the noble could maintain his power through a control over morality, decidedly owning the very diction describing society’s morality (Nietzsche, 13). Of course this sense of morality is not that which is in place today, and it was by the development the second of Nietzsche’s moralities, “slave morality,” which gave rise to our current system ethics. However, it may be noted that while the noble morality may have been based in an interest of power, this slave morality is