Bertrand Russel's Problems of Philosophy

Bertrand Russell's Idealism

In his book The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell splits knowledge into two basic kinds. The first kind of knowledge is that of truths, Russell claims that this sort of knowledge is in accordance with our beliefs and conviction which Russell umbrellas under the term judgments (43). The second kind of knowledge according to Russell is the knowledge of things. This sort of knowledge refers to the knowledge we obtain through which Russell refers to as acquaintance (43). We are acquainted with most notably sense-data and our relation to appearances. But, we are also acquainted with other things such as memory of appearances, and to our own self-conscious, both of which allow us to go from just sense-data of a thing to descriptions of a thing. To better distinguish these two kinds of knowledge Russell uses the example of the Emperor of China. One can truthfully judge (knowledge of truths) that the Emperor of China exists without ever being acquainted (knowledge of things) with the Emperor of China (43). Russell's two basic kinds of knowledge differ in respect that the first is not dependent on a particular sense-datum for its truth hood whereas the second does depend on sense-data for its truth.

Russell splits cases of knowledge of things into two parts, that of acquaintance and that of description. Cases of knowledge by acquaintance are derived mostly through sense-data. Sense-data is the immediate appearance of the color, size, shape, firmness, etc. of an object that the subject is acquainted with. These types of acquaintances are of appearances; Russell does not claim that because the table supplies me with certain sense-data that this sense data is a direct reflection of the table itself. It is the relation between the subject and the object that these simple cases of knowledge exist. Russell claims that it highly doubtable that physical objects even exist, but we cannot doubt the sense-data we receive from them (47). Our knowledge comes from the appearance the object creates in our mind when acquainted with it. Knowledge by acquaintance is the foundation of all our knowledge according to Russell because we must be acquainted with something to have knowledge of it.

Russell's theory of acquaintance is similar to Kant's in that they both deny knowledge of the thing-in-itself but Russell believes sense-data comes from the relation of us and the object. Kant holds that sense-data is supplied by the object and we supply space and time (85). Both are forms of idealism but radically different in the relationship of subject and object, Russell's idealism makes the interaction between subjects and objects the cause of sense-data; whereas Kant claims the object causes sense-data. Russell's theory of subject-object relations also differs from that of Berkeley's. Berkeley argued for an idealism that sense-data was actually in the mind. Berkeley