Mathlab Code

Introduction

Safety culture is all about the we do things around. Organisational accidents are the result of breakdown of policies and procedures that were planned for safety. It is purely because of inadequate attention paid to safety issues.  Typical features related to disasters are where there has been a culture of

1. Profit before safety- where productivity always comes before safety.
2. Fear – problems remained hidden to avoid reprimands and sanctions.
3. Ineffective leadership – incompetency leads to wrong safety decisions and the wrong time for the wrong reason
4. Non-compliance – to the standards, risks, and procedures by managers and workforce.
5. Miscommunication-where critical safety information had not been communicated to decision makers or the message being diluted.
6. Competency failure
7. Ignoring lessons learned.

 Pike River mine tragedy that killed 29 men on Nov 19 2010 in the West Coast region of the South Island near Greymouth was “preventable” and caused by poor company management and ineffective regulations. They lacked the systems and infrastructure necessary to safely produce coal. Ventilation and methane drainage systems were insufficient and “numerous” warnings of methane build up to explosive volumes weren’t seriously looked into.

The royal commission of Pike River mine tragedy informed that the department of labour did not have focus, capacity and strategies to ensure that Pike was meeting its legal responsibilities under the heal and safety laws.

Directors and Executive Managers paid insufficient attention on the health and safety issues of the workers.

Communication, team diversity and trust issues

 Pike’s safety systems were world class, but were never properly used. There were serious gas issues, more than 1000 incidents reported. However only 5 investigation reports were ever completed. The company’s Health and Safety Manager Neville Rockhouse did not have the support from the management to do his work properly. Warning signs were not taken seriously. In a report to the board weeks before the explosion Mine Manager Doug white described gas spikes as more of a nuisance than a risk.  Chief Executive Peter Whittal told journalist that there had been no unusual readings from the sensors inside the mine.

Phase one of the Royal Commission of inquiry pointed out that Chief Executive  Peter Whittal seemed to know very little about the following things: a)he did not know what supplies were kept at the fresh air base that was supposed to be the mine’s safe haven in an emergency, and its room capacity  b) he could not recall if there had ever been a trial to see if workers wearing self-rescue kit could climb the 108 m ladder up the vertical ventilation shaft, the only route to the surface if the main tunnel was impassable. C)  he was unaware of reports from the mine’s gas drainage consultant warning of inadequate infrastructure to drain methane from the coal seam to the surface and which referred to “high level risk” to workers.d) he did not know how many of the mire’s gas sensors were working at the time of explosion.