Ford Pinto Case Study

The Ford Pinto case that was discussed in class is one that has fascinated me for quite some time now. The case deals with Ford Motor Company’s hasty decision to push the hatchback Pinto, ironically codenamed Phoenix, into production to combat the rising popularity of the Volkswagen Beetle in the small-car market [1]. This infamous decision eventually resulted in the Pinto becoming a major blotch on the otherwise virtuous reputation of Ford Motor Company and its management team.

Though the sales of the Ford Pinto piled up in the car's early days, speculation was rife that all was not well with the car [2]. It would soon become apparent that Ford had preferred to focus on their own utility rather than that of their customers, and had made several appalling choices in order to put the Pinto on American roads. The signs of things to come were ominous. The engineers at Ford had done crash tests and had discovered that the car had a tendency to burst into flames when rear-ended at 21 mph, owing to its gas tank rupturing onto the bolts of the axle that was in close proximity. Such a collision resulted in gas being spewed into the passenger compartment and ignited by sparks or hot exhaust [3]. At higher speeds, the chances of the door getting jammed were very high [4]. But since the assembly-line machinery was already in place, the officials at Ford decided to go ahead with the premature production of the car, despite having the capability to make a much safer gas tank with a patent that they actually possessed [4]. For more than eight years after the launch of the Pinto, Ford successfully lobbied against a key government safety standard that would have forced the company to change its fire-prone gas tank [4].

In 1977, Ford finally made a few minor alterations necessary to meet the federal standard that it had managed to hold off for eight years, during which time their internal "cost-benefit analysis" said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner [4]. At the helm of the entire Pinto saga was Lee Iacocca, then the Vice President of Ford, who “conceived the project and was its moving force” ("GRIMSHAW v. FORD MOTOR CO.") [5].

I have been an ardent fan of Lee Iacocca for years now, both for his capacity for innovation as well as his eloquence while describing details of it in his books. The versatility of the work that he did with the rugged Mustang at Ford and then the conservative yet revolutionary Minivan, which revived Chrysler’s dwindling fortunes, speaks volumes of the business acumen that he possesses. Having read Iacocca’s autobiography, where he dedicated a small portion to address the Ford Pinto controversy, I was admittedly biased towards his version of the story, particularly his claim that “there’s absolutely no truth to the charge that we tried to save a few bucks and knowingly made a dangerous car.” (Iacocca and Novak 171-172) [6]. He even